

## **BRI and CPEC: Motives, Vulnerability and Challenges**

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### **Abstract**

*The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is rejuvenation of ancient Silk Road, even much larger in scope and magnitude. From previous six decade, Pakistan-China relations focus mostly on geopolitical and strategic level. CPEC's strategic orientation undermine its economic and developments aspects as the Chinese government signifies BRI win-win and shared economic mutual benefits rhetoric and mitigate domestic problems by externalizing infrastructure development on global scale. BRI originally support the requirements of infrastructure development and address energy deficiency of Pakistan and focus on modernization, innovation and boost up economic activities in the region which ultimately support Chinese domestic vulnerabilities and liabilities of capital accumulation, access over capacity for realization of 'Chinese dream'. This study finds out, how these motivations and objectives address the domestic political, economic and strategic vulnerabilities of both nations? Preferences of geoeconomics over geopolitics, depoliticization of CPEC, maintaining political stability, extend her diplomatic fertility through trade and regional*

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integration are the prerequisite of peaceful development.*

**Keywords:** Geo-economics, Infrastructure Development, Chinese Dream. Sinicization

## **Introduction**

BRI is a “global project of the century” as stated by Chinese President Xi at Belt and Road Forum in 2017 which reflect the narrative of win-win cooperation.<sup>1</sup> Today, Belt and Road Initiative has widely discussed and debate in academic circle either it’s a grand strategy for global domination or purely economic development program. BRI attempt to deal internal problems of capital accumulation and over capacity by external developments through inter-regional connectivity. Offensive realist believes that this rhetoric of shared economic development, proactive and global driven foreign policy in international affairs has hidden hegemonic ambitions.<sup>2</sup> They also argued as BRI evolved, Chinese upsurge military buildup on huge scale and offered a new Marshall Plan through a systematic used of state resources, trade and investment as non-military means to gain strategic objective and create new forms of dissymmetric assertion for BRI beneficiaries to accept Chinese -centric networks which can be assumed for strategic and geopolitical gain.<sup>3</sup>

On contrary, the proponent of BRI support this initiative initially attempt to address the domestic vulnerabilities and liabilities of capital accumulation through externalizing development strategy on regional and trans-regional level and discarded the infrastructure development based on historical capitalist expansion model and export excess capacity towards under developing allies.<sup>4</sup> Foreign Minister of China Wang Fi s stated that BRI is a product of comprehensive alliance, neither a Marshall Plan or geostrategic concept, not a plot of Chinese ambitious goal but a product of globalization, blue print of collective benefits with pellucidity, inclusiveness and impartiality. BRI is significant to address the infrastructure gap for partner countries, a model of reintegration of markets under Chinese leadership.<sup>5</sup>

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor has attracted national and international attention due to its significance for BRI but

everyone is not convinced by infrastructure development that's leads towards economic empowerment, connectivity and transit benefits for Pakistan. Academia and scholar received a mix opinion on CPEC growth through neoliberal infrastructure development narrative. Antagonist think, it would lead towards Pakistani resources exploitations, political subjugation, compromise on territorial sovereignty, an instrument of Chinese imperialism which cost local producer and enterprisers through auspicious tariff rates and a favorable trade and investment policy and competitive advantage of Chinese exports on labor and industries.<sup>6</sup> They cited Chinese Investment for infrastructure gap as a "debt trap diplomacy" and quoted Sri Lanka's handed Hambatnota Port to China Merchant Port Holdings due to \$1 billion in debt to China, warns Pakistan could be another Greece due to unprecedented loans, a matter of serious concerns and criticize these investments a predatory, increase dependency, the strategic burden raises the possibility of avoidances.<sup>7</sup> Chinese governments fervidly denounce the debt diplomacy discourse and argues that Sri Lanka's debt crisis wasn't Beijing's purposefully and intentional plan but lack of decision making, corruption, financial mismanagement and poor economic design of Colombo were responsible.<sup>8</sup>

On contrary to sceptics, Pakistan governments narrative advocate CPEC as 'game changer' a 'flagship project' of BRI, harbinger of peace and development and regional integrations will help alleviate poverty and key to economic progress. Reports of Ministry of Planning Developments and China-Pakistan Study Centre assure that energy projects, rail-road network, telecommunication and infrastructure projects will transform Pakistan and also become a transit economy for Gulf, South Asia, Central Asia and Eurasian region.<sup>9</sup> As a critical appraisal, there is no doubt CPEC is an innovative, credible initiative and bring socio-economic prosperity and harmony in the country if countries political, economic leadership and various ethnic groups are involved in decision making and distribution of resources remained transparent for all. For maximum benefits, Government and military leadership's narrative on CPEC's security and strategic dimensions

required a shift from geopolitical to geo-economic framework. This transition required a clear direction of external policy towards Middle East to keep balance in its relationship with Saudi-Arabia and Iran, remain neutral between America and Iran crisis in the Middle East, support peaceful negotiation between Afghan Taliban and US, speed up transnational energy projects with Afghanistan and take more initiative to boost bilateral trade.<sup>10</sup> Pakistan and India should patronage the paradigm shift by adopted strategic realism approach (state as authorities' actor and avoid proxy wars) which can enhance the chances of resolution of disputed conflict.<sup>11</sup>

A multi-dimensional development initiative of BRI and CPEC influence domestic and foreign policy objectives. Mostly both projects usually perceived geostrategic and geopolitical ambitions but domestic vulnerabilities and liabilities remains important motivations. Chinese investment in CPEC had lots of reason regardless of intrinsic and extrinsic challenges but it provides a blue print of BRI's Chinese motivations and realization of domestic requirements. How these motivations and asymmetrical dependences address the domestic vulnerabilities and fragility of both nations? This study focus motivations of BRI and CPEC are interlink with each other to support political, economic and strategic interest.

## **1) Socio-Economic Motivations and Domestic Liabilities of BRI and CPEC.**

### **i. President Xi 'Chinese Dream' or Xiaokang Society.**

Chinese foreign policy and national developments based on two strategies, preventing conflicts by keeping low profile ( tao guang yan hui 韬光养晦 ) and producing stability on Chinese borders (mulin youhao zhengce 睦邻友好政策) till first decade of first century. In 2012 President Xi introduced the idea of 'Chinese Dream'(zhongguo meng 中国梦 after the conclusion of the 18<sup>th</sup> National congress of communist party of China (CPC) which is an extension of Xiaoguang society. First phase of this goal of country's modernization which means uplift of socio-economic uplift of Chinese people at the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Chinese Communist party. All rural and urban enjoy high standard of living through doubling 2010s per-capita

GDP to \$8000 to \$10,000 by 2020 and completing urbanization around 2030.<sup>12</sup> Second phase of this modernization based on transformation of China into a fully developed nation which means becoming a world leader in research and development , science and technology and business and economics by about 2049, the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of people's republic of China. President Xi ' Chinese dream' distinguishes four parts of aforementioned, Attractive China (healthy environment, low pollution), 'Harmonious China' (amity among social classes); 'Civilized China' (equity and fairness, rich culture, high morals, 'Strong China' (economically, politically, diplomatically, scientifically, militarily).<sup>13</sup> Both the BRI and CPEC are key apparatuses of Xi's 'Chinese Dream' and subsequent international and global ambitions. Xi also reminded the threefold of path, theory, and institutions of socialism with Chinese characteristics as a precondition for achieving the 'Chinese Dream'.<sup>14</sup>

## **ii. Modernization and Infrastructure Development**

To implement 'Chinese Dream', required innovative strategy which follow political priorities and industry requirements. BRI and CPEC serves as a supreme example to diversification of new trade routes and markets to boost economy.<sup>15</sup> In order to address this challenge, Beijing spent sizeable efforts so as to increase the country's 'skill and sophistication in global standards' organizations and building deep knowledge of their regulations, fostering potential advantages in negotiations over competitive advantage of European and US markets.<sup>16</sup> Chinese desires to escape the image of 'fast and cheap' producer by focusing more on technologically-driven and sophisticated products as automotive industry, aviation, machinery, robotics, high-tech maritime and railways equipment , energy saving vehicles, medical devices and information technology . Beijing's 'Made in China 2025' vision inspired by the German idea of 'industry 4.0', of industrial revolution, smart factories and smart supply chain across business is introduced under BRI and CPEC framework.<sup>17</sup>

Beijing has to ensure Chinese standards are accepted by

others. In view of these ‘standardization’ attempts, both the BRI and the CPEC are seen as crucial mechanisms to ensure the dominance of Chinese standards. The CPEC is expected to give the needed impetus to boost the modernization of Pakistan’s economy—since the corridor serves not only as a transit route for commodities and raw materials but also aims at the promotion of production and manufacturing capacities, particularly through the construction of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and industrial estates.<sup>18</sup> It is reported that in 2015, around 4000 industrial units became ‘sick’ which means industries underperformed in normal economic activities of purchasing materials and resources, generate required funds to maintain business cycle and depended on external funds for economic survival which create unemployment’s and frustrations among youth.<sup>19</sup> Special Economic zones had been identifying to connects the economic nodes of urban centers with disadvantage rural areas which create nationwide economic boosts to deal the challenges of adequate employments, absorbs new workers entering the labor market.<sup>20</sup> Successful integration of the CPEC into regional infrastructure networks would lead to new trade arrangements legalizing much of the current trade volume. Last but not least, it is hoped that Chinese investments and the transfer of respective technologies via the CPEC will promote the modernization, diversification and transmitting Chinese standards into the Pakistani market.<sup>21</sup>

### **iii. Energy Security**

Energy Crisis in Pakistan is major barrier of economic development due to lack of political will to address the issues of clear and comprehensive integrated energy strategy , inadequate management of domestic energy capacities , ageing infrastructure, overloaded transmission and distribution systems, energy thefts), and an inefficient use of energy, didn’t pay serious attentions, import energy intern of fuel oils, and lack of investment in energy sectors,<sup>22</sup> 67 % population in Pakistan suffer over 12 hours per day of load-shedding, 75 % of Pakistani companies identified electricity a major constraint for operational growth in 2013 which forced to shut down many companies and industries or divert their investment to other countries which create unemployment, hindered

entrepreneurship, also create social unrest and political turmoil in the society.<sup>23</sup> It is hoped that the CPEC will generate enough money to support Pakistan's power generation capacities and address the country's energy crisis.<sup>24</sup> The fact that a substantial part of the CPEC investments is energy related can be seen as the key incentive for Pakistan's leadership. CPEC-related energy projects will be neither sustainable nor able to generate a positive spill-over effect into all other economic sectors if proper policy with political will didn't adopted.<sup>25</sup>

#### **iv. Bridging Regional Disparities and Stability at Border Regions**

BRI initiative will improve the social and economic conditions in the peripheral areas and ensure political stability and (national) integrity because economic growth generated in the coastal areas had slowly diffuse and materialize into the hinterland and expectation of trickle-down effects to balance the regional developments. The privileged rich eastern seaboard and poor western regions creates social and political discontent which was initially address in GWDS program in 1999 to reverse centrifugal tendencies of separatism, religious cross-border connections and eradicate extremism in Xinjiang regions.<sup>26</sup> The BRI and especially the CPEC constitute crucial instruments to persuade economic conditions in restive regions such as Xinjiang and in bordering countries such as Pakistan will bring more stability and eventually help undermine the 'three evils' separatism, terrorism and religious fundamentalism.<sup>27</sup> From 'Controlled Instability' to 'Sustainable Security' part of China's development strategies concerns the stabilization of fragile neighboring states specially Afghanistan. Two remarkable examples of this are the inclusion of Afghanistan into its development initiatives, especially the CPEC and the support all the peace process initiative take by Russia, America and Pakistan.<sup>28</sup>

One of the overriding objectives of both the BRI and the CPEC is to address China's deepening regional disparities, especially so as to spur economic growth in its underdeveloped hinterland and rustbelt<sup>29</sup> Since the beginning of the 1990s, the

Chinese leadership adopted the Great Western Development Strategy (GWDS) in 1999, also known as ‘Open Up the West’ (xibu da kaifa) campaign which covers six provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan), five autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang), and one municipality (Chongqing). These regions have been largely side-lined by Beijing’s development planners, which hampered the sustainable social and economic growth mainly due to unfavorable geographical conditions, lack of economies of scale, weak industrial agglomeration, excessive exploitation of resources and generally low technological levels.<sup>30</sup> The proponents of the BRI see the initiative ‘as the solution to helping overcome China’s struggle with developing its chronically underperforming regions by integrating them into a holistic, externally orientated development program’<sup>31</sup> Less developed areas can be found in provinces such as Baluchistan, Gilgit-Baltistan, parts of rural Sindh, KPK, and Pakistan-administered Kashmir and southern districts of Punjab. The China Pakistan corridor has potential to bridge interregional disparities and remove structural imbalances with the country to tune down the political turmoil and end the debates over fair mechanism.<sup>32</sup> It is expected that both the CPEC and the BRI will create incentives for both Chinese state-owned and private enterprises as well as foreign companies to expand their economic activity, create jobs, and raise consumption levels in the under-developed and landlocked province of China and Pakistan and connected them to Middle East, Central Asia and European markets.<sup>33</sup>

## **2) Motivations for Shared Global Responsibility and International Order.**

Aside from domestic factors (economic, social, political), and given China’s ambition to play an equal and responsible role in the existing international system to fulfil its national objectives, the BRI can be said to present several implications for the international world order. Beijing’s global responsibility required different strategies, as discussed in the points that follow.

### **i. The Build-Up of New Financial Mechanisms and Institutions**



In order to implement the BRI vision, Beijing established new multilateral financial institutions and mechanisms and re-directed existing ones. The Silk Road Fund (SRF) or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is of particular importance in this regard.<sup>34</sup> The core objectives of the new financial instruments corresponding to the BRI are determined by the search for new uses for Chinese capital surpluses as well as the internationalization of the underpowered renminbi (It is expected that a successful BRI and CPEC) would show the advantages of Chinese financial mechanisms so as to face global development challenges and manifest Beijing's position on deciding the terms and conditions of the international financial system. The latter achievement would help Beijing promote China's image as the new worldwide frontrunner in international development and cooperation.<sup>35</sup>

#### **ii. The Establishment of an Alternative System for Conflict and Dispute Resolution**

As part of China's attempts to promote its standards at international level, Beijing partly endeavor to establish a Chinese judicial mechanism for dispute resolution within the geographical framework of the BRI: each country joining the BRI will be asked to accept Beijing's suggestions for international legal legislation, for example for dispute resolution. For this end China initiated the creation of three courts—with new legal bodies established under the authority of the Supreme People's Court of China based in Beijing, Xi'an and Shenzhen.<sup>36</sup> The Xi'an court will, among other issues, manage investment and trade disputes for the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt; the Shenzhen court will deal with sea-route related commercial cases for the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road connecting China, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe.<sup>37</sup> It seems that Beijing tries to use the natural necessity for international legal procedures so as to establish its own institutional legal framework as an alternative to the exiting dispute resolution systems to speed up the process of legal matters on acceptable negotiations .

### **iii. Sinicization and Public Diplomacy**

Sinicization can be understood as a strategy of acculturation and assimilating both intra-national minority groups and neighboring cultures and powerful process, flexible ideological tool for 'making the world more suitable to China.'<sup>38</sup> China applies practices and policies so as to penetrate different domains beyond the cultural one, especially the domains of politics, economy, and security. In this light, the BRI and the CPEC serve as instruments of Sinicization, as a platform for promoting Chinese culture through the means of soft-power and social harmony.<sup>39</sup> For this purpose, Chinese government launched a multi-layered campaign of 'nation branding' through public diplomacy, provide a platform for international dialogues, like Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BARF), 'Bao-Forum for Asia (BFA) and high level meetings and debates which promote Chinese perspective's on political and economic discourse to reshape the current world order.<sup>40</sup> In sum, Sinicization processes in the context of Beijing's goal of achieving 'harmonious relations' means the re-arrangement of the existing international order in terms suitable for Chinese win-win model for International development<sup>41</sup>

### **3) Geopolitical and Security Challenges for BRI and CPEC.**

Besides the romantic evocation of the historical legacy of the ancient Silk Road and the Chinese officials' rhetoric praising the win-win situation and mutual benefits, both the BRI and the CPEC contain political, geostrategic and security calculations meant to preserve the high-priority national interests of China.<sup>42</sup> The New Silk Road must therefore be understood as the most advanced approach through which Beijing translates its economic success into more political and strategic spaces on the global stage.

#### **i. Reducing the US' and India's leverage in Both Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region.**

China's economic growth rate has exceeded available of energy and resources. Chinese dependency on energy and raw material supplies on Middle East and one quarter from Africa, 50% gas come from Turkmenistan explains why BRI as a

strategy of ‘extractive resource diplomacy’.<sup>43</sup> The achievement of energy security and the stable supplies of necessary resources is a precondition to the achievement of the nation’s determinant of ‘self-sufficiency’ and advancement of ‘indigenous innovation’. China is eager to face dangers so as to get access to ‘off-limits’ places and to do this even in extraordinary problematic states of Africa, Central Asia and Middle East.<sup>44</sup>

The current diplomatic turmoil under Trump’s administration and increasing tensions in the South China Sea as well as the North Korea challenge are indicators for the likelihood of such a scenario and ‘Malacca-Dilemma’, gains further significance if one takes into account that around 80% of Chinese energy imports flow from East Africa pass through Malacca route, It appears that sea-borne trade remains the most reasonable option: ‘it would be easier for the United States to prevent the unloading of oil at Gwadar than to blockade the Strait of Malacca’<sup>45</sup> China seems determined to reduce its reliance on the Malacca passage as much as possible. In order to secure its sea-based transport and trade, China wishes to expand its maritime facilities—especially in the Indian Ocean. The build-up of port-facilities such as the ports of Gwadar, Karachi in Pakistan is an essential step towards the goal of integrating the Indian Ocean region and improving access for secure refueling, replenishing, and ship repair facilities<sup>46</sup>. China perceives that port developments (including naval facilities) constitute a crucial move towards the ‘break out of US and Indian containment efforts’ and a challenge US military aggression against Chinese economic and trade interest.<sup>47</sup>

Islamabad remained the fourth largest recipient of United States Aid after Egypt, Afghanistan, Israel to gain assistance in military organization, hardware development, to keep its economy afloat and deal the state budget deficits.<sup>48</sup> US conditions and supports remained discriminatory and as ignoring Pakistan’s security concerns and vulnerabilities as witness during 1965 and 1971 war against India, restrict Pakistan’s nuclear program, post-cold war era, President

Obama AF-Pak policy, etc. Washington reduced its engagement and selective for its engagements for their national interest. Beijing reacted in a remarkably helpful to Pakistani rapprochement attempts and offered large-scale and multi-sectoral aid, and with the only major condition of ensuring a safe environment for Beijing's projects in Pakistan.<sup>49</sup> Given the extent of the CPEC investments, Chinese capital is likely to substitute the 'traditional' US military assistance in Pakistan. Recently, US President Donald Trump sharpening rhetoric "principled realism" against Pakistan to revised strategy for Afghanistan, referring Pakistan's role in combating crossing border militancy "Lies and deceit" and outlined suspensions of security assistance to Pakistan worth about \$ 2 Billion and consider India as most important strategic ally in South Asia likely enhance the convergence of Sino-Pakistan interest.<sup>50</sup> US decision makers later on recognized Pakistani efforts of negotiations and step back from designated status of state-sponsor terrorism, respects Pakistan's stance on Afghanistan peace process. American un-reliable gesture with political conditions which suits their national interest always reshape US and Pakistan relations. In short, both the BRI and the CPEC present China's vision of creating a comprehensive economic, political, and cultural network so as to promote multidimensional connectivity and cooperation among the participating countries and bounce back the influence of both the US and India in the Asia-Pacific and Indian oceans.

#### **4) Prerequisites for Peaceful Development of CPEC**

An important point to emphasize is that CPEC is a fusion of Pakistan's Vision 2025 and the structure of BRI. Pakistan has already started gaining socio economic benefits from CPEC. Following are the prerequisites for peaceful development of CPEC.

##### **i. Improving Economic and Social Conditions**

It is compulsion for Pakistan to boost its national economy through macroeconomic stability because fiscal and external imbalance due to trade deficit, falling foreign exchange reserve and decreasing in internal remittances has eroded since last decade 2008-2018 .<sup>51</sup> Poor Health Indicators, Illiteracy , poverty rate is highly significant high where 36.9 % of

population living below the poverty line, Nearly four out of ten Pakistanis live in multidimensional poverty<sup>52</sup>, referring access to good education, insufficient healthcare, poor housing, and an unsafe environment,<sup>53</sup> the country's human development indicators (income gap, gender inequalities, education, poverty reduction measures) remain among the lowest in South Asia.<sup>54</sup> CPEC raised high hopes for improving macro-economic and development indicator, reduce national trade deficit with China, contribute to international balance of payments, human developments, improve energy and industry infrastructure and create more stable environments for international investment and improve foreign exchange reserve.

**ii. Geo-economics Approach and Regional Integration.**

Pakistan's political and strategic elites believe that state of survival which dominated by security paradigm should be modified and focus more on economic pragmatism and least overemphasis the strategic dimension. Hindu-Muslim antagonism, everlasting struggle over territory of Kashmir, colonial legacies, fear of Indian regional dominance, threat perception, socio-ethnic grievances and Indian constantly refused to accept Pakistan's sovereignty, issues of cross-border terrorism, hardly leads to constructive collaboration on economy matters. Threat perceptions on both sides is still relevant today both because of the two countries' conventional military capabilities (and nuclear weapon capabilities), current government's collective narcissism over territorial dispute of Kashire, potential economic conflicts.<sup>55</sup> Revival of historic trade routes with India through CPEC is a bright opportunity and using CPEC as the main platform for this cooperation exclusive on economic and developmental bases with China. Islamabad's leadership is persuaded that only through partnership with Beijing and New Delhi will the country and its armed forces be able to build up economic competences and enough financial resources so as to decrease economic and military imbalances through regional integration. In the past, relations between China and Pakistan were exclusively dominated by concerns regarding security and defence.

Nowadays Islamabad wishes to further deepen cooperation and benefit from China's willingness to go beyond geopolitics and towards economic and commercial relations. As pointed out by Ahsan Iqbal, Pakistan's minister for planning and development, the CPEC will change the scope of Sino-Pakistani ties 'from geopolitics to geoeconomics', which will have a 'significant transformative effect on Pakistan's economy'.<sup>56</sup> If implemented successfully, the CPEC will change 'the entire geo-strategic importance of Pakistan. Islamabad expects that the fusion of national development strategies through the CPEC will facilitate policy coordination between China and Pakistan and deepen their ties.'<sup>57</sup>

### **iii. Political stability and Terror Free Pakistan**

Vision of Pakistani governments 2025 bases on eradication of violence, religious extremism and terrorism.<sup>58</sup> The government ambitions to achieve a 'terror free' Pakistan through economic growth—which is expected to spur socio-economic uplift among the citizenry. Pakistan's security policy stated that fight against all the anti-state forces, militancy, radicalization and deal with cross-border terrorism and jihadism which develop the trust of international community and it's a pre-condition for trade benefits and financial aid.<sup>59</sup> Political instability brought serious changelings for social harmony and economic performance of any country, Pakistan is prime example of this narrative due to Wars, military involvements in political matters, political discontent among the political parties of all the provinces, and lack of economic will to deal the socio-economic issues with consensus. Center-state relations, better opportunities for economics of underdeveloped regions specially FATA, Baluchistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and South Punjab regions create social, and political harmony. CPEC provided this credibility and capability which create political consensus and create opportunity with glue of infrastructure connectivity and distribution of equal financial resources.

### **iv. Extend Diplomatic Fraternity and Strengthen International position**

CPEC provide Pakistan create position for regional trade and strengthen her diplomatic fraternity at international level. After 9/11 Pakistan is labeled as state-sponsored terrorism, religious

intolerant, human rights violator and destructive relationship with her neighbor countries which face diplomatic isolation, lack of international investment and tourism due to security and reputational issues. The CPEC would entrust Pakistan with new economic self-confidence, strengthen her geo-economic positions to collaborate with Russia, Afghanistan and Iran, massive economic capabilities and help to address Pakistan's reputational challenges and provided a new international status to engage regional players like Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, UK and European community for mutual economic cooperation's.<sup>60</sup>

### **Recommendation and Conclusion.**

From previous six decade, Pakistan-China relations remained geopolitical and strategic oriented. CPEC's strategic orientation undermine its economic and developments aspects as BRI support the idea of win-win and shared mutual benefits. BRI originally support the idea of geo-economics, infrastructure development and address energy deficiency of Pakistan and focus on modernization, innovation and boost up economic activities in the region. Strategic dimension and political consideration of BRI and CPEC consume useless energies to produce an investment friendly atmosphere to win the confidence of her domestic investors to address over capacity and capital accumulation problem of China. To address the domestic vulnerabilities of economics, trade expansion and commercial potential of Chinese markets remained a most import goal of BRI and Chinese government expects depoliticization of CPEC brought unprecedented commercial, educational, technological and economic opportunities for Pakistan.

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